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I. INTRODUCTION
As with the United States Constitution, many American state constitutions
contain provisions condemning equal protection denials by government. State
provisions often have the same wording as the Equal Protection clause of the federal
Constitution. Many state courts also read such state equal protection provisions, as
well as other state constitutional equalities, to guarantee no greater protections than
are afforded federally.' They are "in lockstep," though spurring occasional criticism.2
*
Jeffrey A. Parness is a Professor Emeritus at Northern Illinois University College of
Law. This paper flows from earlier works, including a paper presented at the symposium, "State
Constitutional Reform in the New South," in Charleston, South Carolina on January 16, 2009 and at
the 2009 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association in Denver, Colorado on May 29, 2009.
Thanks to Ed Laube, Zach Townsend and Frank Lima for their excellent research assistance with this
paper. Special thanks also to Professors Richard Aynes, Ann Lousin and Helen Hershkoff for their
thoughtful comments.
1.
They do so at times even when state constitutional equalities predate the federal Equal
Protection clause. At times, state constitutions themselves effectively require "lockstep" judicial
decisions. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24 ("This Constitution shall not be construed by the courts
to afford greater rights to criminal defendants than those afforded by the Constitution of the United
States, nor shall it be construed to afford greater rights to minors in juvenile proceedings on criminal
causes....").
2.
See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutionsas Guardiansof Individual Rights, 61 N.YU. L. REv. 535, 550-51 (1986) (criticizing
those who say "proceeding in lockstep with the Supreme Court is the only way to avoid irrational

law enforcement"); JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, EQUALYTY AND LBERTY IN THE GOLDEN AGE OF STATE

CONsTrmONAL LAw, at xx, xxi, 15-18 (2008) (criticizing "the older version of Our Federalism"
while praising the significant trend toward "the New Judicial Federalism"). While state courts can
interpret independently state equal protection guarantees, they often do not do so. See, e.g., Marc L.
Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Leaky Floors: State Law Below FederalConstitutionalLimits, 50 ARIZ.
L. REv. 227, 230 n.9 (2008) ("By most estimates, state courts have not often exercised their
uncontested authority to read their state constitutions independently and to place greater restrictions
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But some American state constitutions contain special equality provisions that go
beyond general equal protection and that have no federal counterparts. These
provisions necessitate independent state constitutional interpretation as there can be
no lockstepping. For example, some state constitutional rights are self-executing or
self-operative. As well, in Illinois, there are three special equality provisions, dealing
with employment, housing, local government and school districts. Of course, special
state constitutional equality provisions can extend, but not diminish, any federal
constitutional equalities.3
Not all special state constitutional equality provisions speak expressly about
equality. Some insure freedom from discrimination while others demand uniformity
or sameness of treatment. However, these provisions often are read as requiring
equality.4 Yet there are sometimes reasons to treat differently equal protection,
on government than the federal Constitution requires."). But see Gordon Eddy, The Development of
Independent New York ConstitutionalJurisprudencein ChiefJudge Kayes Judicial Opinions: An
EmpiricalStudy, 71 ALB. L. REv. 1137, 1137 (2008) (measuring the success of one state high court
justice to advance independent state constitutional interpretation).
3.
Under federal constitutional Supremacy Clause precedents, federal statutory, regulatory
and common law principles, as well as federal constitutional law dictates, can trump state laws
affording fewer equality guarantees. See, e.g., Kimberly West-Faulcon, The River Runs Dry: When
Title VI Trumps State Anti-Affirmative Action Laws, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1075, 1076 (2008) (explaining
that because of preemption, state constitutional anti-affirmative action provisions do not eliminate
considerations of race undertaken to remedy federal statutory "racial effect discrimination"). But see
Miller & Wright, supra note 2 at 227 (finding "below the floor" readings by state courts of certain
federal constitutional rights of criminal defendants).
As well, local government initiatives can extend, but not diminish, federal constitutional
equalities as well as any other federal laws or laws of statewide applicability. The New York City
Human Rights Law serves as an example. See, e.g., Jyotin Hamid & Mary Beth Hogan, The New
York City Civil Rights Restoration Act Grows Teeth, 81 N.Y. ST. B.J. 34, 34 (2009) (showing how
sexual harassment claims are easier to pursue under city rather than federal or state laws).
4.
For example, in Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008), the U.S. Supreme Court
recently afforded comparable treatment to differently worded equality statutes. It ruled that the "plain
meaning" of a federal statute guaranteeing all U.S. citizens "the same right. . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens .. . to inherit . . . property" involves banning "discrimination based on race." Id. at 1936
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006)). Thus, in determining whether a retaliation right is statutorily
included, the right should be construed like other federal statutes that are more explicit about
nondiscrimination, but do not mention such a right. Id. at 1942-43 (discussing whether 29 U.S.C. §
633a(a) (2006) which mandates that "[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees ... who are at least
40 years of age ... shall be made free from any discrimination based on age" prohibits retaliation).
Typically state agencies, often designated as Human Rights Commissions, are established
legislatively to enforce, and perhaps define, state constitutional equality. See, e.g, S.C. CoDE ANN. §
1-13-40(a) (2005) ("There is hereby created in the executive department the South Carolina Human
Affairs Commission, to encourage fair treatment for, and to eliminate and prevent discrimination
against, any member of a group protected by this chapter...."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-13-20 (2005)
("[T]he practice of discrimination against an individual because of race, religion, color, sex, age,
national origin, or disability [is]. .. a matter of state concem and .. . unlawful and in conflict with
the ideals of South Carolina and the nation...."). However, they can be created constitutionally. See,
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equality, nondiscrimination, and uniformity provisions. Nevertheless, all such
provisions can be described as American state constitutional equalities.
General state equal protection guarantees are usually limited to governmental
acts, as in the federal Constitution, while nondiscrimination and other equality
responsibilities have been extended by state constitutions, on occasion, to private acts.
State constitutional equalities may speak of positive rights rather than limits on
government, arguably prompting greater judicial responsibilities for protection.
Further, where state constitutions guarantee equal protection by governments,
inequalities caused by others also occur. State constitutional provisions could
explicitly impose an affirmative duty to end such inequalities upon governments,6
though the federal constitutional Equal Protection clause provides no similar
mandate.7
This article explores the extent to which American states have and should further
promote constitutional equalities.8 It first explores the benefits of explicit
constitutional guarantees. It then examines current American state constitutions.
Finally, it demonstrates how new state constitutional mandates can prompt greater
equalities.

e.g., MICH. CoNsT. art. 5, § 29 ('There is hereby established a civil rights commission which shall ...
investigate alleged discrimination against any person because of religion, race, color or national
origin in the enjoyment the civil rights guaranteed by law ... and to secure the equal protection of
such civil rights without such discrimination.").
5.
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1132, 1132 (1999) (urging state courts to act with greater
fidelity to alternative state constitutional norms, while exploring welfare assistance claims).
6.
For example, while the Bill of Rights in the District of Columbia recognizes "a
fundamental right .. .to be free from historic group discrimination, public or private, based on race,
... sex, ... poverty, or parentage," and other criteria, it goes on to say: "Affirmative action to correct
consequences of past discrimination against women, and against racial and national minorities, shall
be lawful." D.C. CoNs. art. 1,§ 3.
7.

In the absence of an express mandate, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized in some

settings (particularly race and sex) that federal constitutional equal protection allows governments to
act affirmatively to limit de facto discrimination. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Hendricks, Contingent Equal
Protection:Reachingfor EqualityAfter Ricci andPics, 16 MIcH. J.GENDER& L. (forthcoming 2010)
(arguing that federal constitutional equal protection, in sex and race, has allowed (if not always
mandated), and should continue to allow, governments to pursue "a positive right to substantive
equality" in contexts where de facto inequality continues). Some might say contemporary
inequalities are pursued in order to diminish longstanding inequalities.
8.
The paper does not explore how American state constitutions compare to foreign
country constitutions. See, e.g., James A. Thomson, State ConstitutionalLaw: Some Comparative
Perspectives, 20 RUTGERs L.J. 1059, 1066 (1989) (questioning whether foreign experience can

"leam from or contribute to" American state constitutionalism).
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II. THE BENEFITS OF EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITIES

American state constitutions can play a key role today in protecting individuals.9
State constitutional laws can afford protections beyond those dictated by federal
lawmakers. While the federal Constitution chiefly implies individual rights through
recognizing federal and state governments with express and limited powers, state
constitutions often "contain positive or affirmative rights."1o At worst, expansive
state constitutional rights are hortatory, simply duplicating important federal values or
iterating unenforceable local values. At best, they extend new rights locally, deeming
unlawful any oppressions that are irrational or uncompelling.1 1
Because of their narrower setting, in constitutional matters states are more able
"to experiment, to improvise, [and] to test new theories. ,,1 2 Thus, if "a state
experiment succeeds, others may follow," and if an experiment fails, the failure will
be isolated.13 As well, because they are more prone to amendment than the federal
Constitution, -state constitutions can more quickly respond to failed experiments,
9.

Brennan, supra note 2, at 552 (arguing that federalism protects individual rights at both

the state and federal level); Ann Lousin, Challenges FacingState Constitutions in the Twenty-First
Century, 62 LA. L. REv. 17, 27 (2001) (arguing that in the coming century all American states should
have constitutions with "a strong bill of rights"); Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005)
("As the highest court of this state, we have said that we are and should be the 'first line of defense
for individual liberties ... .') (quoting State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985)).
10. Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: InterpretingState Constitutions As Unique
Legal Documents, 27 OLA. CrrY U. L. REv. 189, 192 (2002). In other words, since the federal
government is limited to acting only where it is specifically authorized by the Constitution to do so,
"federal constitutional rights are primarily negative in nature." Id
11.
See, e.g., Christopher W. Hammons, State ConstitutionalReform: Is It Necessary?, 64
ALB. L.REV. 1327, 1342 (2001).
The inclusion of particular ... policy type provisions in the constitution indicates that
these policy areas are important to the citizens of the state. In this sense, the
constitution of the state can be tailored to reflect the political culture or values of the
people who live under it .... To this end, a very detailed constitution may actually
have greater utility than the more generic model that many constitutional reformers
propose.
Id.
12.
Stanley Mosk, The Power of State Constitutions in Pmtecting InividualRights, 8 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 651, 652 (1988) (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
13. Mosk, supranote 12, at 652 (citing Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(arguing that states are political and social laboratories)). This has been recognized by others on the
United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292
(1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
14.
Williams, supra note 10, at 228. On the values of citizen-sponsored state constitutional
initiatives, see Ward Connerly, Achieving Equal Treatment Thmugh the Ballot Box, 32 HARv. J.L. &
PuB. Pol'y 105, 105 (2009), arguing that direct democracy is key to protecting individual freedoms
in face of governmental abuse.
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social changes, and new values.15 Of course, for many, too many amendments may
diminish the enhanced or special status of constitutional law. 6
State constitutional rights can be read to be independent of, and thus to reach
beyond, federal constitutional rights17 even when the federal and state constitutions
are both applicable and employ the same or similar language.' For example, a
reasonable search or seizure for federal constitutional purposes may be an
unreasonable search or seizure under a state constitution.' 9 A state constitutional right
15.
See, e.g., Stanley H. Friedelbaum, JudicialFederalism:Current Trends and Long-Term
Prospects, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1053, 1084-85 (1992) ("Rights of privacy, environmental
protection provisions, equal rights guarantees, and other innovative reforms have been found in
recent additions to state constitutions."). But see Bruce E. Cain & Roger G Noll, Malleable
Constitutions: Reflections on State Constitutional Reform, 87 TEX. L. REv. 1517 (2009)
(recommending that constitutional provisions establishing political and human rights should be
changed only through the revision process, while provisions on the details of government should be
subject to change through an easier amendment process).
16.
It has been reported, for example, that the California constitution has been amended
more than 500 times. Beth Fouhy, Most Populous State Could Open Up Constitution, ABC NEWS,
April 23, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStoryid=7412134 (quoting John Grubb of the Bay
Area Council in San Francisco). On August 16, 2009, the Los Angeles Times called for a third
constitutional convention, following the 1849 and 1879 conventions. See, The Cahfornia Fix; Start
fiom Scratch: A Constitutional Convention is the Best Opportunity for the State to Reclaim its
Purpose, L.A. TIMS, Aug. 16, 2009, at A29, available at http://articles.latimes.com
/2009/aug/16/opinion/ed-conventionl6. For a discussion of contemporary American state
constitutional changes more generally (including amendments and revisions), see G Alan Tarr &
Robert F. Williams, Foreword Gettingfrom Here to There: Twenty-First Century Mechanisms and
Opportunitiesin State ConstitutionalReform, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1075 (2005), and Robert F. Williams,
Should the Oregon Constitution Be Revised and If So, How Should It Be Accomplished?, 87 OR. L.
REv. 867 (2008), for a review of significant American state constitutional changes of the Twentieth
Century.
17.
William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of IndividualRights, 90
HARv. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977) ("State constitutions ... are a font of individual liberties, their
protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal
law.").
18.
Id at 495 (recognizing that independent interpretations are possible even when state
constitutional rights are "identically phrased"). Courts often use certain factors in determining
whether to extend broader rights under a state constitution than are required by the federal
constitution. See, e.g., Washington v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (Wash. 1986) ("We deem the
following six nonexclusive neutral criteria ... relevant to determining whether ... the constitution of
the State of Washington should be considered as extending broader rights to its citizens than does the
United States Constitution."); Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005) ("[When both
constitutions use identical or substantially similar language . . . [w]e . . .will

apply the state

constitution if we determine that the Supreme Court has retrenched on Bill of Rights issues, or if...
federal precedent does not adequately protect . . . basic rights and liberties."). Timing may be
especially important if the state provision predated the federal provision.
19.
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175, 178, 180 n.1 (Ohio 2003) ("Section 14,
Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors," though the words of
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can also follow the federal constitutional language on federal rights, even though that
federal right is inapplicable to the states. 20
State constitutions can also expressly recognize rights and limits on
governmental conduct that are unaddressed in the federal Constitution. 2 1 Thus, they
can expand rights by condemning private as well as public acts resulting in
inequalities.22 They can explicitly speak to privacy and other enumerated rights,23
thus avoiding the difficulties in recognizing similar protections through vague terms
like liberty and through unenumerated rights analyses. 24 Further, state constitutions
can explicitly limit state governmental acts directed at certain citizens who are far less
protected or relatively unprotected under the federal Constitution.25 Finally,
the two constitutional provisions are quite similar, meaning the interpretations of the Ohio and federal

constitutions are "harmonize[d] . .. unless there are persuasive reasons to find otherwise") (quoting
State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ohio 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)); People v.
Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1338-45 (N.Y 1992) (finding that the New York constitutional provisions on
searches and seizures limited administrative searches to help police uncover evidence of crimes in
ways that were not limited by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution).
20. See, e.g., State v. Forfeiture of 2003 Chev. Pickup, 202 P.3d 782, 783 (Mont. 2009)
(finding that while the federal and Montana constitutional provisions on excessive fines "are virtually
identical," the federal provision has not been applied by the U.S. Supreme Court to the states).
21.
As well, state constitutions can establish very different executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of state government, and quite varied schemes for their checks and balances, than operate
for the federal government under the United States Constitution. For example, constitutionally
recognized executive branch officers often go beyond the Chief. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. IV, § 1
("The Executive Department ... shall consist of a Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General,
Auditor General, State Treasurer, and Superintendent of Public Instruction.
). At least one
American state legislature is unicameral. See NEB. CONST. art. Ill, § 1. The state judiciary is at times
limited to courts whose authority is not ordained and established by the legislature and whose judges
and justices are elected by popular vote. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 12. In addition, some state
high courts (as in Maine and New Hampshire) can render advisory opinions on proposed legislation.
22. See, e.g., IL. CONST. art. I, § 19 ("All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall
be free from discrimination .. . unrelated to ability in the hiring and promotion practices of any
employer.").
23. See, e.g., IL. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The people shall have the right to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and other possessions against unreasonable searches, seizures, invasions of
privacy or interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means."); CAL.
CONsT. art. I, § 1 ("All people ... have inalienable rights. Among these are ... pursuing and
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."). This California constitutional provision was read to apply
to private acts in Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 476, 480 (Cal. 2009) ("[A]
private entertainment venue's security arrangements [i.e., patdown inspections] ... implicate the state
constitutional right of privacy....").
24. See, e.g, Daniel 0. Conkle, Judicial Activism and Fourteenth Amendment Privacy
Claims: The Allure of Originalism and the Unappreciated Promise of Constrained Nonoriginalism
(Mar. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-137 1080).
25. See, e.g., MONT. CONST. art II, § 4 ("Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation,
or institution shall discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on
account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas."); HAw.

2009/10] AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITIES

779

comparable constitutional rights and limits may themselves be read differently from
state to state. Thus, there can be varying interstate levels of judicial protection for
certain comparable rights with heightened judicial review required at times.2 6
Greater equalities should be especially promoted by state constitutions where
significant and unfair inequalities continue without other federal or state law
remedies. 27 One example is discrimination based upon sexual orientation. A quick
review of contemporary American state constitutions reveals there is already a wide
range of local constitutional initiatives furthering equality.

m. CURRENT STATE CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITIES
The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution declares that "No state
shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."28
This equality principle is applicable to local units of government within American
states and to the federal government under the Fifth Amendment.29 Its words thus
CoNsT. art. I, § 5 ("No person shall be ... denied the enjoyment of... civil rights or be discriminated

against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.").
26.
Compare Vamrnum v. Brien, 763 N.W2d 862, 878, 880 (Iowa 2009) (holding that
because the Iowa constitution article 1, section 1, recognizes "[a]ll men and women are, by their
nature, free and equal," classifications based on sexual orientation are suspect and subject to
"intermediate scrutiny"), and Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 507 (Conn. 2008)
(recognizing that CONN. CONsT. art. I, § 20 assures that "[n]o person shall be denied the equal
protection of the law .
),with Conaway v. Deane, 932 A.2d 571, 635 (Md. 2007) (holding that
sexual orientation is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class so that a rational basis test applies with
regard to Maryland constitution article XX1V, which embodies the federal constitutional equal
protection concept, even though it speaks of "due process" and is independent of the federal
constitution), and Anderson v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 987-88 (Wash. 2006) (holding that
prohibitions to same-sex marriage does not violate Washington constitution article XXXI, § 1,which
assures "[e]quality of rights ... shall not be denied .. . on account of sex"). Intrastate variations in
protections for comparable rights can also arise. Compare, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 2343, 2351-52 (2009) (holding that adverse employment decisions are reviewed differently in
"mixed-motive" Title VII and ADEA cases), with Hughes v. Pair, 209 P.3d 963, 974 (Cal. 2009)
(holding that the requirements governing sexual harassment under a civil code provision regarding
business relationships are similar to the requirements for a statute goveming workplace
discrimination).
27.

See, e.g, 2 FRANK P. GRAD & ROBERT F. WILUAMS, STATE CONSTmTnONS FOR THE

TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (2006) ("[Slubjects ... appropriate for constitutional treatment ...
necessarily include ... matters deemed so important to that particular state as to call for constitutional
treatment."); id.at 23 (discussing the consideration of the "enduring nature" and "popular consensus"
for inclusion of constitutional subjects where resolution by legislative or other governmental
measures is not assured). Compare REG GRAYCAR & JENNY JANE MORGAN, Equality Rights: What I
Wrong?, in RETHINKING EQUALITY PROJECTS INLAW: FEMINIST CHALLENGES 105 (Rosemary Hunter
ed. 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1371315 (questioning whether equality principles
might develop better if there were no formal recognitions ofequality in constitutions or statutes).
28.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
29.
See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (explaining that the Fifth
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bind all American governments. Similar wording on state and local governmental
duties are repeated in many American state constitutions. In South Carolina, 30
Illinois3 Louisiana,32 Maine33 North Carolina,34 Nebraska, 3s Georgia,36 and
Montana,37 no person is to be "denied the equal protection of the laws." 38 In TexaS39
and Massachusetts, 40 constitutional equalities are more specific as it is declared that
equality under law "shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed,
or national origin." Equal protection sometimes is an affirmative duty, rather than a
constraint, as in Kansas where governments "are instituted for th[e] equal protection
and benefit" of "the people."4A "While the federal conception of equality has become
relatively static, its state counterpart is d amic ... [so that c]onstitutional equality is
now ajoint federal and state enterprise.' 2
American state constitutions expressly recognize equality in other ways. For
example, the Arkansas Constitution declares: "All men are created equally free and
independent" with "certain inherent and inalienable rights,4 3 secured as a result of
Amendment provides a norm of equal protection indistinguishable from that within the Fourteenth
Amendment; "concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal
of fairness, are not mutually exclusive"); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975)
("This ... approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same
as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment"). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 93 (1976) ("Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under
the Fourteenth Amendment.") (citing Weinbeiger 420 U.S. at 638 n.2).
In a state without a constitutional provision on equality, equal treatment can also be read into the
state constitutional due process clause. See, e.g., Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 626 A.2d 372,
375 (Md. 1993).
30. S. C. CoNsT. art. I, § 3.
31.
ILL.CONST.art.1,§2.
32. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
33.
ME. CoNsT. art. I,§ 6-A.
34. N. C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
35. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 3.
36.
GA.CONST.art.I,§ 1, 2.
37. MoNT. CoNsT. art. II, §4.
38. Until 1970, only seven states had state constitutional equal protection clauses. Since
then, the number has more than doubled. SHAMAN, supranote 2, at 41.
39. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3a. This provision has been read to go beyond "both the United
States and Texas due process and equal protection guarantees." In re McLean, 725 S.W.2d 696,698
(Tex. 1987) ("[T]he ... Amendment elevates sex to a suspect classification.").
40. MAss. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
KAN. CoNsT. Bill of Rights, § 2; see also MAss. CoNsT. art. 1H,§ 4 ("[G]ood citizens ...
41.
shall be equally under the protection of the law . . . ."); Mo. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("[A]ll persons are
created equal and are entitled to equal rights and opportunity under law ... ."); TEx. CONST. art. I, § 6
("[I]t shall be the duty of the Legislature to pass such laws as may be necessary to protect equally
every religious denomination in the peaceable enjoyment of its own mode ofpublic worship.").
SHAMAN, supra note 1,at 44.
42.
43. ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 2. Similar is Ky. CONST. of Bill of Rights § 1 ("All men are, by
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In Indiana, "all people are created

equal," being "endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable rights...."45 In

Wyoming, "all members of the human race are equal."46 In Arizona, "[n]o law
granting ... privileges or immunities ... shall not equally belong to all citizens or
corporations."4 7 In Utah, not only are "all free governments" founded on the people's
"authority for their equal protection and benefit,"AS but also "[a]ll laws of a general
nature ... have uniform operation."A9 In Alaska "all persons are equal and entitled to
equal rights, opportunities, and protection under the law .... ,"5 Colorado "[c]ourts of

justice shall be open to every person ... ."5 In New Mexico, "[a] uniform system of
free public schools" shall be "established and maintained" "for ... all the children of
school age . . . ."52

And in Georgia, governmental "[p]rotection to person and

property ... shall be impartial and complete."5 3
Some states have more particular equality norms in addition to very general
equal protection guarantees. Thus in Louisiana, the constitution says:
No law shall discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas,
beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical
condition, or political ideas or affiliations. 54
In Montana, the constitution declares:

nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable rights."). Compare FLA. CONsT. art.
I, § 2 ("All natural persons, female and male alike...."), and MASs. CoNsT. art. I, § 2 ("All people are
born free and equal....").
44. ARK CONST. art. 2, § 2.
45.
IND. CONST. art. I, § 1. The same constitution says "[t]he General Assembly shall not
grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall
not equally belong to all citizens." Id at art. I, § 23.
46. WYo. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
47. ARiz. CoNsT. art. II, § 13 (exempting laws on municipal corporations).
48. UTAH CONST. art. I, § 2.
49. UTAH CoNsT. art. I, § 24.
50.
ALAsKA CoNsT. art. 1,§1.
51.
CoLo. CONST. art. II, §6.
N.M. CoNsT. art. XII, § 1 (equalities across schools and among all children in the
52.
schools).
53.
GA. CONST. art. I, § I, 2.
54.
LA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3. This provision has been read to go beyond the decisional law
construing federal constitutional equal protection. State v. Granger, 982 So. 2d 779, 787-88 (La.
2008). Where a Louisiana state constitutional provision has been read to "go beyond" the comparable
federal provision, in some settings it may still provide no "additional protections." State v. Kennedy,
957 So. 2d 757, 779 n. 1 (La. 2007) (addressing a "cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment" claim in
death penalty case involving aggravated rape of a minor).
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Neither the state nor any person, firm, corporation, or institution shall
discriminate against any person in the exercise of his civil or political rights on
account of race, color, sex, culture, social origin or condition, or political or
religious ideas.ss
In North Carolina, "discrimination by the State" is also constitutionally prohibited if
based on "race, color, religion, or national origin. ,,56 And in Florida, a constitutional
provision, after declaring "[a]ll natural persons . .. are equal before the law," goes on:
"No person shall be deprived [sic] of any right because of race, religion, national
origin, or physical disability."57
State constitutional equality provisions generally are unlike other provisions. For
example state constitutional health care provisions typically express only public
concerns, not public duties, and therefore such provisions infrequently set forth health
care rights. 58 Thus, "state constitutions and case law offer little support for a
cognizable right to health [or healthcare]...."5 State constitutions provide much
support for enforceable equality rights
One American state has quite strong express constitutional equalities. In Illinois
three constitutions preceded the current 1970 constitution.6 The 1818 Illinois
Constitution, drafted and debated within three weeks, 6 1 contained no explicit
provision on equality. 62 The 1848 constitution contained a "substantially unchanged"
Bill of Rights 63 and the 1870 constitution contained a Bill of Rights like its
predecessors. 4 The 1870 constitution remained in place for a century.s The journey

55.
MoNT. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
56.
N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 19.
57.
FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 2.
58. Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalismand the Right to Health Care, 12 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. app. A at 72 (forthcoming 2010), availableat
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1421504.
59. Id. at 71. On the promises of state constitutional protections against sex-based
discrimination, see generally Linda J.Wharton, State EqualRights Amendments Revisited:
EvaluatingTheir Effectiveness in Advancing ProtectionAgainst Sex Discrimination,36 RuTGERS L.J.
1201 (2005).
60. ILL. CoNsT. of 1818; ILL. CONST. of 1848; ILL. CONST. of 1870.
61.
JANET CoRNEUus, CoNsTrrTToN MAKING INILUNOls, 1818-1970 at 10 (1972).
62.
While it had no general or special equal protection/nondiscrimination provision, the
1818 constitution did declare "[t]hat all men are bom equally free and independent." ILL. CONsT. of
1818, art. VIII, § 1. It also said "[that elections shall be free and equal." Id. art. VIII, § 5. It clearly
did not contemplate equality for women or nonwhites, as the right to vote was recognized for "all
white male inhabitants." Id art. VIII, § 27.
63. CORNELuus, supranote 61, at 40.
64. Id.at 65.
65. ELmER GEuRz & JOSEPH P. PISCIOTTE, CHARTER FORANEwAGE: AN INSIDE VIEw OF THE
SDcTH ILUNOIS CONSTmmONAL CONVENTION 3-4, 12 (1980).
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to its amendment began in the 1940S66 and ended with a call in 1968 for a
constitutional convention. Interestingly, a new Bill of Rights was not part of the
initial agenda, 6 8 though a Bill of Rights Committee was formed.6 9 This Committee
began its work by studuing similar bills in other states, the model state constitution,
and scholarly articles. Four new equality provisions emerged, with some very
independent provisions. In approving the 1970 constitution, the people adopted
equality provisions within the Bill of Rights quite different from not only earlier
Illinois provisions, 72 but also from constitutional provisions in other American
states.73 The 1970 Illinois Bill of Rights contains both explicit equal protection 74 and
antidiscrimination75 provisions.
Given earlier difficulties in undertaking
constitutional reforms in Illinois through the General Assembly,76 as well as the
historical lack of independent state constitutional interpretation by the Illinois
courts,

77

the 1970 initiatives were quite significant.

78

They replaced stagnant Illinois

66.
Id. at 6 (regarding the formation of the Committee on Constitutional Revision of the
Chicago Bar Association, with Chicago lawyer Samuel W. Witwer as chair).
CORNELIUS, supra note 61, at 144.
67.
68.
ELMER GERTz, FOR THE FIRST HOURS OF TOMORROW: THE NEW ILLINOIS BILLOF RIGHTS
7 (1972).
69.
GERTZ & PIsCOTrE, supra note 65, at 66.
70.
GERz, supranote 68, at 7-15.
71.
ILL. CONsT. art. I, §§ 2, 17-19.
72.
Ann Lousin, The 1970 Illinois Constitution:Has It Made A Diference?, 8 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 571, 599-600 (1988) ("The 1870 Constitution had guaranteed due process of law, but not equal
protection ofthe laws.").
73.
Elmer Gertz, The Unrealized Expectations ofArticle I, Section 17, 11 J. MARSHALL J.
PRAC. & PROc. 283, 283 (1978) (asserting that the new Bill of Rights contained the "strongest
nondiscrimination provisions of any state constitution").
ILL. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 2, 18.
74.
75.
ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 17, 19.
76.
Samuel W. Witwer, Introduction, 8 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 567, 567 (1988) ("[T]he 1870
Constitution had become virtually unamendable.") accord CORNELIUs, supra note 62, passim. The
1970 constitution included for the first time an "automatic 20-year question," whereby a possible
constitutional convention was placed on the general election ballot every 20 years in the absence of
General Assembly action. Witwer, supra, at 567. Previously, the General Assembly had sole
discretion to convene a constitutional convention. Id.
77.
See Brannon P. Denning, Survey ofIllinois Law: ConstitutionalLaw, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J.
733, 758 (2001); 14 ILL. L. & PRAC. Courts § 94. The so-called lockstop doctrine exists where a state
high court generally applies a United States Supreme Court analysis of the federal constitution to
similar state constitutional provisions.
78.
Gertz,, supranote 73, at 283.
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constitutional doctrine 9 that failed to fulfill the distinctive role of state
constitutionalism urged by many.8o
In 1970, Section 2 of Article I was added. It contains the general proposition that
8
"[n]o person shall be ... denied the equal protection of the laws." ' Section 17
embodies more particular assurances, and the strongest of the guarantees of equality,
as it says:

Section 17.
Property

No discrimination in Employment and the Sale or Rental or

All persons shall have the right to be free from discrimination on the basis of
race, color, creed, national ancestry and sex in the hiring and promotion practices
of any employer or in the sale or rental of property.
These rights are enforceable without action by the General Assembly, but the
General Assembly by law may establish reasonable exemptions relating to these
rights and provide additional remedies for their violation. 82
Sections 18 and 19 are also more particular about equality than Section 2, though
seemingly less protective than Section 17, since they do not contain self-executing
clauses. These two sections say:
Section 18. No Discrimination on the Basis of Sex
The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex by the State or its units of local govemment and school districts.
Section 19. No Discrimination Against the Handicapped
All persons with a physical or mental handicap shall be free from discrimination
in the sale or rental of property and shall be free from discrimination unrelated to
ability in the hiring and promotion practices of any employer.84

79. GERTz & PIscIOTrE, supra note 65, at 3-6 (viewing the Illinois constitution as
antiquated).
80. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 17, at 503 ("[S]tate courts ... [have a] manifest purpose. .
to expand constitutional protections.").
81.
82.
83.
educational
84.

ILL. CONST. art. 1,§ 2.
Id. § 17.
Compare id. § 18 with Aiz. CoNsT. art. XI, § 6 ("The University and all other State
institutions shall be open to students of both sexes....").
ILL. CONST. art. 1,§ § 18-19.
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The General Assembly enacted the Illinois Human Rights Act to implement the
new equality provisions.85 Unfortunately, it falls short in its guarantees by unduly
restricting those who can seek remedies.86 To date the Illinois Supreme Court has
paid excessive deference to the General Assembly, thus abandoning many who suffer
the very inequalities specifically addressed in the new constitution.87 Nevertheless,
the Illinois provisions demonstrate the potential scope of explicit state constitutional
equality norms.
Elsewhere in the United States, the Illinois pattern is followed, with general
equal protection statements as well as specific equality mandates. As noted, general
equality norms are often88 expressed in different terms, like "uniform operation" 89
and sameness. 90 Some special state constitutional equality norms go beyond
employment, property transactions, and governmental acts, including schooling.
Some go beyond race, color, creed, national ancestry, sex, and handicap. On the other
hand, inequalities are sometimes encouraged by state constitutions, though subject to
federal constitutional limits.
Special equalities under law can also be promoted in some states without express
reference to equal protection or nondiscrimination. 91 For example, in California "[a]
85.
Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/1-102 (West 2001 & Supp.
2009).
86.
For example, within the definitions sections, the General Assembly has limited the
persons covered by the protections of the Act. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/2-101, 5/2-102 (West
2001 & Supp. 2009). For a critique of the Act, see generally Jeffrey A. Pamess & Laura J. Lee,
Inequalities in Illinois Constitutional Equality, N. ILL. U. L. REV. 3 (forthcoming), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract- 13 54060.
87.
Lousin, supra note 72, at 602 ("In effect, then, there is no longer a constitutional remedy
against employment discrimination in Illinois.").
88.
Sometimes equality is promoted through terms that do not strongly suggest equal
protection assurance. See, e.g., Lamarche v. McCarthy, 965 A.2d 992, 997 (N.H. 2008) (the state
constitutional provision rights regarding remedies for all injuries and to obtain justice freely, New
Hampshire constitution article XIV, part 1, "is basically an equal protection clause in that it implies
that all litigants similarly situated" receive "like protection" in the courts) (citing Follansbee v.
Plymouth Dist. Ct., 856 A.2d 740, 742 (N.H. 2004) (quoting State v. Basinow, 371 A.2d 458, 459
(N.H. 1977))).
89.
See, e.g., IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 6; UTAH CoNsT. art. I, § 24. Compare R.I. CoNsT. art. I, §
2 ("[T]he burdens of the state ought to be fairly distributed among its citizens."), and VT. CoNsT. ch.
I, art. 7 ("The government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and
security of the people....").
90.
See, e.g., N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 21 (mandating that privileges and immunities are granted
to all citizens "upon the same terms"); ARIz. CONST. art. II, § 13 ("[T]he same terms[] shall [apply]
equally . . . to all citizens or corporations."). For the long history of American state constitutional
provisions "directed toward precluding unequal privileges or immunities," see SHAMAN, supra note
2, at 28.
91.
Compare, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 20 (stating "civil or political rights" should be
based on "equal protection" and not "segregation or discrimination"), and N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11
(permitting no denial of "equal protection" or "discrimination" in civil rights matters).
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person may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession,
vocation, or employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethnic
origin."92 Additionally, in California "[n]oncitizens have the same property rights as
citizens."93 In Kansas, "[n]o distinction shall ever be made between citizens [and
noncitizens] in reference to" certain property matters. 94 In New Mexico, "perfect
equality" exists for "[c]hildren of Spanish descent ... with other children in public
schools."95 And in Arizona "free" schools "shall be open to all pupils between the
ages of six and twenty-one years." 96
Special equality norms occasionally go beyond employment, property sale or
rental, and more specific constraints on government, as with schooling. For example,
some states explicitly direct equalities and nondiscrimination in certain railroad
matters. Thus in Kentucky, railroads and other common carriers are to be "regulated,
by general law, as to prevent unjust discrimination" 97 in freight and passenger
transportation. As well, Kentucky railroads are to operate all cars and freight "with
equal promptness and dispatch, and without any discrimination as to charges." 98
In Hawaii, citizens cannot "be denied enlistment" or "segregated" while in a state
"military organization ... because of race, religious principles or ancestry."9 In
Missouri "[n]o citizen shall be disqualified from jury service" or from holding state
office because of sex. 00 In Wyoming, there is "political equality" so that laws
"affecting the political rights" of citizens shall not distinguish based on "race, color,
sex, or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual
incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court."' o1 In Connecticut, there
In
are equalities "in the exercise or enjoyment of... civil or political rights."
Illinois, "taxes upon real property shall be levied uniformly."' 0 In California, there is
to be no discrimination or preferential treatment of individuals or groups "on the basis
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of... public

92.
CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
Id.§ 20.
93.
94.
KAN. CoNsT. Bill of Rights, § 17.
95. N.M. CoNsT. art. XII, § 10.
96.
ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 6.
97.
KY. CONST. § 196; see also COLO. CONST. ANN., art. XV, § 6 (containing a similar
provision).
KY. CONST. § 213; see also ARK. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 3 (containing a similar provision).
98.
99.
HAw. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
100. Mo. CONST. art. VIl, §§ 22(b), 10; see also W. VA. CONST. art. m, § 21 (prohibiting sex
discrimination injury service).
101. WYo. CoNsT. art. 1,§ 3.
102. CONN. CONsT. an. I, § 20.
103. ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 4(a).
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And in North Dakota, "[a]ll individuals" possess the "inalienable

105
right[] ... to keep and bear arms ... for lawful . . . recreational .. . purposes."

Special equality norms also extend inappropriate classifications beyond the
Illinois provisions on race, color, creed, national ancestry, sex and handicap. For
example, aliens who are bona fide residents have the same property rights as nativeborn citizens in Colorado.106 Equality mandates operate in Connecticut for any
person with "physical or mental disability,"l 0 7 which is, perhaps, different from the
Illinois provision on "physical or mental handicap."'os
Nondiscrimination
protections extend in New Jersey to "religious principles."' 0 9 Mandates are also
found in Montana regarding "political ... ideas," "culture," and "social origin or
condition."ll 0 In the District of Columbia, there are equality assurances for "sexual
orientation, poverty, or parentage.""' In Iowa, "[fjoreigners" who are or may
become Iowa residents "enjoy the same rights" in property as native-bom citizens." 2
In South Dakota, "privileges or immunities" must belong "equally" to "all citizens or
corporations."" 3 In Delaware "all persons rofessing the Christian religion ought
forever to enjoy equal rights and privileges." 4 And in Arkansas, no citizen may be
"exempted from any burden or duty, on account of... previous condition."" 5
While equality and nondiscrimination mandates commonly appear, state
constitutional inequalities are occasionally promoted. Sometimes they benefit state
104. CAL.CONST. art. 1, §31(a).
105. N.D. CoNsT. art. I, § 1.
106. CoLo. CoNsT. art. II, § 27. Accord MICH. CoNsT. art. X, § 6 ("Aliens who are residents
of this state shall enjoy the same rights and privileges in property as citizens of this state."); S.D.
CoNST. art. VI, § 14 (disallowing property "distinction ... between resident aliens and citizens");
CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 20 ("Noncitizens have the same property rights as citizens."). ContraNEB.
CoNsT. art. I, § 25 (disallowing "discrimination between citizens of the United States in [property
matters]" and stating that "[t]he rights ofaliens . .. may be regulated by law").
107. CONN. CoNsT. art. I, § 20.
108. Compare BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 494 (8th ed. 2004) (defining disability as "[a]n
objectively measurable condition of impairment"), with ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DIClONARY,
http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_/handicap.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (handicap is
"something that hinders or is a disadvantage to somebody"). See also Ill. Pub. Act 95-668 (amending
775 ILCS § 511-103(I)) and replacing the term "handicap" with the term "disability").
109. N.J. CoNsT. art. I, § 5; see also MONT. CoNST. art. II, § 4 (prohibiting discrimination
based on "religious ideas").
I 10. MONT. CoNsT. art. II, § 4.
111. D.C. CoNsT., Bill of Rights, art 1,§3. The District of Columbia's constitution goes on to
declare that "[tjhose who exercise or advocate" the expressly-granted rights involving choices about
procreation and sexual behavior have "the right to be free from all forms of discrimination." Id at §
4.
112. IowACoNsT. art. I, § 22.
113. S.D.CONsT.art.VI,§ 18.
114. DEL. CoNsT., Declaration of Rights, § 3.
115. ARK. CoNsT. art. 2, § 3.

788

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:3

residents over nonresidents. Sometimes they benefit discrete groups of residents,
and, other times, they burden discrete groups of residents. Thus, Alaska is not
prohibited "from granting preferences on the basis of Alaska residence," 1 though
property taxes cannot be different for in-state and out-of-state U.S. residents." 7 In
Montana, "servicemen, servicewomen, and veterans may be given special
consideration determined by the legislature.""s In Virginia, while "governmental
discrimination" upon the basis of sex is banned, "the mere separation of the sexes
shall not be considered discrimination.""19 A number of American states have
recently denied equalities to committed same sex couples by constitutionally banning
marriages for them.' 2 0 Finally, in Rhode Island, while "no person shall ... be denied
equal protection of the laws" or subject to discrimination by the state or those doing
business with the state, these guarantees shall not be "construed to grant or secure any
right relating to abortion or the finding thereof"'21
IV. GREATER STATE CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALmES
Additional American state constitutional equalities are best promoted by
following the article I, section 17 approach in Illinois. "All persons" can be accorded
nondiscrimination rights, not just those dealing with government.122 Equalities in
employment (and perhaps in sale or rental of property) matters are usually broadly
supported, embodying core contemporary local values provoking little dispute. As in
Illinois, equality rights in employment could be enforced constitutionally "without
action by the General Assembly," though legislative voice regarding "reasonable
exemptions" and possible "additional remedies" might be deemed appropriate.123
The self-executing nature of a constitutional right, as in Section 17 in Illinois,
should generally mean the right is not simply "hortatory."l 24 Self-executing
116. ALASKACONT. art. I, § 23.
117. ALASKACONST. art. IX,§ 2.
118. Mont. Const. art. II,§ 35.
119. VA. CONST. art. 1,§ 11.
120. See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 7.5 ("Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid
or recognized in California."); OR. CONST. art. XV, § Sa ("[O]nly a marriage between one man and
one woman shall be validly or legally recognized as a marriage.").
121. R.I. CoNsT. art. I, § 2 (effectively discriminating toward those seeking medical care).
122. ILL. CONsT. art. 1,§ 17.
123. Id.
124. Acconi AIDA v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 772 N.E.2d 953, 960-61 (Ill. App. Ct.
2002) (the Individual Dignity Clause of the Illinois Constitution, article I, section 20, without a selfexecuting provision and condemning communications inciting "violence, hatred, abuse or hostility
toward a person or group ... by reason of.. . religious, racial, ethnic national or regional affiliation,"
was only "hortatory," creating no private right; was like "a constitutional sermon," not "an operative
part of the constitution," was included "to serve a teaching purpose, to state an ideal or principle to
guide;" and, was "merely an expression of philosophy and not a mandate that a certain remedy be
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constitutional rights should be protected against legislative usurpationl 25 through, for
example, statutes that divert the right from trial courts to administrative agencies or
similar alternative adjudicatory bodies that have: no jurors; diminished coercive
authorities (like subpoena powers); and, fewer procedural safeguards for aggrieved
claimants (such as formal discovery).
However, many explicit self-executing constitutional rights today are not free
from all legislation. In the District of Columbia "[fjreedom from [d]iscrimination,"
which encompasses both "public" and "private" acts, is "self-executing," but
"enforced by appropriate legislation."l 26 In Michigan, while the constitutional
provision outlawing discrimination and "preferential treatment"l27 in public schools
is "self-executing,'"28 an accompanying constitutional provision declares the
available "remedies" are "the same ... as are otherwise available for violations of
Michigan's anti-discrimination law."' 2 9 The Michigan courts have not clarified the
extent to which this constitutional provision is "self-executing" in that legislative
authorization is unnecessary. Michigan courts have suggested in other contexts that

provided in any specific form"). But see Burt Neubome, Forewon, State Constitutions and the
Evolution ofPositive Rights, 20 RUTGERs L.J. 881, 895 (1989), who said:
Moreover, the very existence of a set of substantive state constitutional provisions
dealing with poverty concerns should transform the approach to state due process and equality
provisions. One can understand the reluctance of a federal judge to use the federal Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses to generate substantive floors in areas that are wholly
foreign to the federal text. Where, however, the constitutional text demonstrates an intense
substantive interest in the plight of the poor, a judge's willingness to use the state's Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses to reinforce the substantive concerns already present in the
constitution's text should be much greater.
See also GRAD & WILLAMs, supra note 27, at 93 ("When a court holds that a particular
provision is self-executing, it treats the state constitution as meaningful and operative law, and
prevents the provision from being rendered nugatory by legislative inaction."). Of course,
constitutional rights without self-executing clauses may be still be protected judicially from
legislative usurpation. For example, the intentions of the constitutional drafters might include limited
roles for the General Assembly.
125. See WASH. CONST. art. 31, §§ 1-2 (equality of rights for both sexes, enforced by
"appropriate legislation"); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 3 (personal enjoyment of civil or political rights
without regard to race, color and the like shall be implemented by the legislature); HAw. CONST. art. 1,
§ 3 (equality of rights under law not to be denied by the State on account of sex; the "legislature shall
have the power to enforce" by "appropriate legislation").
126. D.C. CoNST. art. I, § 3. Incidentally, all sections in the Bill of Rights are later deemed

"self-executing" with no mention oflegislation. Id at § 24.
127. MICH. CoNsT. art. I, § 26(1).
128. MIcH. CoNsT. art. I, § 26(7).
129. MICH. CONST. art. 1,§ 26(6). Similarly, in California, the antidiscrimination provision

governing public employment, education and contracting is in a "self-executing" section but
nevertheless has the same remedies as are "available for violations of then-existing California
antidiscrimination law." CAL. CONST. art. 1,§ 31.
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"self-executing" rights somewhat diminish legislative discretion.130 One "selfexecuting" constitutional right was said to be not "a mere statement of abstract
principles."' 3 1 Another "self-executing" provision "serves as an express limitation on
the authority of the Legislature."' 3 2 Thus, legislative enactments sometimes cannot
"impose additional obligations," or "undue burdens" on self-executing constitutional
provisions "unless otherwise expressly indicated."' 33 The term "self-executing"
suggests a more passive legislative role. It is defined b1 Merriam-Webster as "taking
effect immediately without implementing legislation."' 4
In Texas assurances of "[e]quality under the law"'3 5 are simply deemed "selfoperative." 36 The intent is unclear. While Texas judges have not precisely defined
the term "self-operative," they have suggested that less legislative authority exists
with respect to other "self-operative" provisions. ' 3 They have also held that the legal
consequence of a "self-operative" clause can be automatic.' 38 Black's Law
130. Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 348 & n.30, 349 (Mich. 1985)
(interpreting Michigan Constitution, article II,section 9 as a "self-executing" constitutional provision
that "serves as a limitation on the powers of the legislature"). Article II, section 9 states: "The people
reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and to enact and reject laws, called the initiative, and
the power to approve or reject laws enacted by the legislature, called the referendum."
131. Durant v. Dep't of Educ., 463 N.W.2d 461, 469 (Mich. 1990) (interpreting as "selfexecuting" the constitutional provision granting taxpayer standing to enforce specific tax provisions
in Michigan constitution article IX, section 32, while declaring the same section goes beyond
"abstract principles" and was not meant to "remain dormant until given life by legislative
enactment").
132. Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 348 (referring to the right to referenda in Michigan
constitution article II, section 9).
133. Wolverine Golf Club v. Hare, 185 N.W2d 392, 395 (Mich. 1971) (interpreting as "selfexecuting" the constitutional provision granting taxpayer standing to bring suit to enforce specific tax
provisions in Michigan constitution article IX, section 9, holding: It is "settled law that the legislature
may not act to impose additional obligations on a self-executing constitutional provision. The only
limitation, unless otherwise expressly indicated, on legislation supplementary to self-executing
constitutional provisions is that the right guaranteed shall not be curtailed or any undue burdens
placed thereon.").
134. MERRIAM-WEBsTER ENGLISH DicrnONARY, http://merriam-webster.com/dictionary/selfexecuting (last visited Mar. 20,2010); see also GRAD & WILLIAMS, supranote 27, at 91-95.
135. TEx. CoNsT. art. I, § 3a (pertaining to equality in matters of "sex, race, color, creed or
national origin").
136. Id.
137. A. & M. Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Bryan, 184 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1945)
("Section 9 ofArticle XI appears to be self-operative and absolutely exempts from taxation the public
property therein referred to, whereas Section 2 of Article VIII vests in the Legislature the power to
determine whether or not the public property therein referred to shall be exempted from taxation;"
thus suggesting a greater legislative role in clauses that are not considered "self-operative").
138. Wackenhut Corr. Corp. v. Bexar Appraisal Dist., 100 S.W.3d 289, 291-92 (Tex. Ct. App.
2002) (the provisional constitutional provision barring the taxation of govemment property used for
public purposes, article XI, section 9, is "self-operative" and thus is "effective immediately"'); see
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Dictionary defines "operative" as "being in or having force or effect."' 39 Seemingly,
"self-operative" in Texas means, at the least, having force or effect independent of
legislation.
When permitted, reasonable legislative "exemptions" can include, as in Illinois
under section 17, certain religious institutions. Consider equalities in employment
with religious groups.
Unfortunatelyl4 in Illinois the legislators have also
exempted small employers from the constitutional equality norms on employment,
notwithstanding the express constitutional directive that "all" persons have equality
rights and the implicit limit that any "exemptions" not undercut the broad
constitutional protections.
Constitutional recognition of possible "additional" General Assembly remedies,
as in section 17 in Illinois, would preserve traditional judicially-created remedies
against those engaged in inequality/discrimination while also permitting new
remedies through legislation, like attomey's fee recoveries; vicarious liability, and
responsibilities for unintentional acts.' 42 Unfortunately in Illinois, state legislators
have so far read their powers regarding "additional" remedies to encompass powers
regarding any, all, or no remedies,14 3 leaving far too many people suffering Illinois
unconstitutional inequalities with no effective means of redress. Perhaps this resulted
because other, relatively new, express Illinois constitutional rights, like those
involving crime victims, explicitly permit the General Assembly to determine and
enforce the possessor of the rights. 44 Unfortunately, for lawyers and nonlawyers
alike, all or most constitutional rights are perceived as similar. Notwithstanding its
erroneous reading, section 17 stands as an exemplary model for those seeking to
also Jones v. State, 77 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (the effect of a "self-operative"

statute is "automatic").

139. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1124 (8th ed. 2004).
140. See, e.g., Coulee Catholic Schs. v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm., 320 Wis.2d 275
(Wis. 2009) (finding Catholic school teacher's age discrimination claim fails because it impinges
upon school's religious freedoms under federal and state constitutions).
141. See, e.g., Parness & Lee, supra note 86. The Illinois General Assembly has effectively
read the limits regarding only "reasonable exemptions" as permitting quite broad discretion, not
unlike settings where there is no self-executing right to sue and there is a requirement that there be
implementing statutes. Compare WASH. CONsT. art. XXXI, § 2 (equality rights provision shall be
enforced by "appropriate legislation"), and HAw. CoNsT. art. I, § 3 (stating the same).
142. It is unclear whether the power, as in Illinois under article I, section 17, to provide
"additional remedies" for violations of rights regarding freedom from discrimination encompasses
authority to expand the categories of rights available, or only to expand the remedies for rights
violations that are solely defined by the courts. See ILL. CoNsT. art. I,§ 17.
143. Compare, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 26(6) (stating "remedies" available for certain
constitutional violations "shall be the same ... as are otherwise available for violations of Michigan's
anti-discrimination law"), and CAL. CoNsr. art. 1, § 31 (similarly stating that remedies for certain
constitutional violations are the same as those available under then-existing California
antidiscrimination law).
144. ILL. CONsT. art. I, §8.1(ab).
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expand state constitutional equalities as it leaves primary responsibility for defining
and enforcing rights to the courts.14 5
Explicit state constitutional rights that are not expressly deemed "self-executing"
are in danger of becoming simply hortatory in the absence of legislation. Some state
constitutions seek to prompt legislation though a failure to enact may be difficult to
challenge. Thus, the Michigan constitutional assurance of equal protection is
followed by an apparent mandate for General Assembly implementation. 46 By
contrast, the United States Congress is only explicitly delegated the "power to
145. Consider Justice Harlan's concurring and dissenting opinion in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400

U.S. 112,204-05 (1970), where he opined:
As the Court is not justified in substituting its own views of wise policy for the commands
of the Constitution, still less is it justified in allowing Congress to disregard those
commands as the Court understands them. Although Congress' expression ofthe view that
it does have power to alter state suffrage qualifications is entitled to the most respectful
consideration by the judiciary, coming as it does from a coordinate branch of government,
this cannot displace the duty of this Court to make an independent determination whether
Congress has exceeded its powers. The reason for this goes beyond Marshall's assertion
that: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is." . . . It inheres in the structure of the constitutional system itself. Congress is subject
to none of the institutional restraints imposed on judicial decisionmaking; it is controlled
only by the political process. In Article V, the Framers expressed the view that the political
restraints on Congress alone were an insufficient control over the process of constitution
making. The concurrence of two-thirds of each House and of three-fourths of the States
was needed for the political check to be adequate. To allow a simple majority ofCongress
to have final say on matters of constitutional interpretation is therefore fundamentally out
of keeping with the constitutional structure. Nor is that structure adequately protected by a
requirement that the judiciary be able to perceive a basis for the congressional
interpretation.
As with the federal constitution, American state constitutions do not permit easy amendment or
revision by the state legislatures, though some state legislatures have been far more active than
Congress in changing their constitutions. See, e.g., TARR & WLIAMs, supra note 15, at 1076-1102
(reviewing American state revision, amendment commission and initiative processes for state
constitutional change).
Notwithstanding Justice Harlan's observations, even those committed to significant federal
judicial authority regarding defining and redressing federal constitutional rights recognize there must
be greater shared congressional power than that held by the Illinois General Assembly power under
section 17. Congress can provide a constitutionally adequate alternative remedial scheme outside the
article III federal courts, via power to enforce, that the Illinois General Assembly can not establish
under section 17. Section 17 rights are "enforeable without action by the General Assembly" and
can only be served "additional" statutory "remedies" for constitutional violations. On this more
expansive Congressional power, see Michael P. Robotti, Separationof Powers and the Exercise of
ConcurrentConstitutionalAuthority in the Bivens Context, 8 CoNN. PuB. INT. L.J. 171, 203 (2009).
146. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2 ('The legislature shall implement this section by appropriate
legislation."). Incidentally, the same constitutional provision also recognizes the same legislative
implementation authority for its special equality mandates. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2 ("[Nor shall any
person be denied the enjoyment of his or her civil or political rights or be discriminated against in the
exercise thereof because of religion, race, color or national origin.").
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enforce ... by appropriate legislation" federal constitutional equal protection
guarantees involving state and local governments.147 Similar enforcement authority
for constitutional equality in matters of sex is recognized in Hawaiil48 and
Washington. 149
Enforcement authority in the Congress may be either broader or narrower than
the implementation authority of the Michigan General Assembly. Federal
enforcement authority, while restricted "to adopting measures to enforce the
guarantees" of the Fourteenth Amendmento50 is a broad power,'51 "not limited to
mere legislative repetition'l52 of the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisprudence on
individual rights. Thus, under certain circumstances legislative enforcement can
include an expansion of equality rights as well as a scheme for equality rights
Implementation in Michigan may not be as broad a legislative
enforcement.1
power. But, the U.S. Supreme Court has also generally denied Congress permission
to redefine governmental obligations under the Equal Protection Clause,' 54 as this
would intrude on the province of the courts who, and "not Congress, ... define the
substance" of equal protection.155 The determination of whether a statute "constitutes
147.
148.

U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
HAw. CoNsT. art. I, § 3 (stating such matters shall be "enforce[d], by appropriate

legislation").
149. WASH. CoNsT. ANN., art. I, § 2 (stating such matters shall be "enforce[d], by appropriate
legislation").
150. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (limiting Congress' power under
amendment XIV, section 5, to enforcement).
151. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 732 (1982) (declaring Congressional
power to enforce under amendment XIV, section 5, is a "broad power indeed").
152. Board of Trs. of Univ. ofAla. V Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001).
153. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (finding
congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment at times may "include the power to
define situations which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt prophylactic
rules to deal with those situations"); Garrett,531 U.S. 356 365 (finding legislative power to enforce
is not limited to repetition of Supreme Court jurisprudence; rather it includes both the authority to
remedy and to deter violation of guaranteed rights "by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of
conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text" (quoting Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) ("Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can
fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct
which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States,"' (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976))).
154. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 722 (2003) (Congress "may not
attempt to substantively redefine the states' [Fourteenth Amendment] legal obligations").
155. See, e.g., Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728 ("[I]t falls to this Court, not Congress, to define the
substance of constitutional guarantees."); id.at 756 (Congress may not "enforce a constitutional right
by changing what the right is." (quoting City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 519) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 ('The ultimate interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's
substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch." (internal citation omitted));
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appropriate remedial legislation, or instead effects a substantive redefinition of the
Fourteenth Amendment right at issue, is often difficult," as the "line between the two
is a fine one."1 56 Implementation authority in Michigan would be broader if it
allowed redefinitions of equality rights.
Although the Michigan general equal protection provision could be read to apply
only to state action, the Michigan legislature has implemented equality extensions to
the private sector.'57 A similar extension of the federal Equal Protection Clause by
Congress would be impossible.' 58 So here Michigan implementation is broader than
Congressional enforcement.
Yet, the authority to implement rather than to enforce also arguably authorizes
legislation in Michigan narrowing state constitutional equalities. The Michigan
legislature has, for example, denied prisoners certain equality rights under the state's
Civil Rights Act.' 59 But, the Michigan courts have stopped short of allowing the
legislature full "power to ultimately define the substantive meaning" of that state's
equal rights amendment.160 Thus in Sharp v. City ofLansing,161 the court held that
conduct permitted by a legislative implementation scheme is at times subject to
judicial review and may infringe on constitutional protections. The Congressional
enforcement authority regarding Fourteenth Amendment equal protection has not
been read to allow Congress to redefine when equality violations occur (or when,
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (Fourteenth Amendment deprives "Congress of any power to interpret and
elaborate on its meaning by conferring self-executing substantive rights against the States, and
thereby leaving the interpretive power with the Judiciary." (internal citation omitted)); id. at 508
(Congress' power to enforce "is only preventative or 'remedial").
156. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519-20).
157. Sharp v. City of Lansing, 629 N.W.2d 873, 876 (Mich. 2001) (finding the Michigan
Civil Rights Act extends the Michigan Constitutional Equal Rights Amendment, thus "prohibit[ing]
racial employment discrimination by private ... employers").
158. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) (Fourteenth
Amendment generally offers no protections from private conduct). But see United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 762 (1966) (Congressional enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment
covers "laws punishing all conspiracies ... that interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment
rights").
Congressional extensions of equality protections, as in employment, can be done legislatively
by using powers outside section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, like the power to regulate interstate
commerce. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)
(sustaining federal statute barring discrimination in public accommodations under Interstate
Commerce Clause).
159. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2103 (West 2001) (legislature intends that prisoners are
"not within the purview of this act").
160. Sharp, 629 N.W.2d at 878 (holding the safe harbor provision of the Michigan Civil
Rights Act does not extend to claims directly pursued under the Equal Protection Clause).
161. Id. ("[T]he mere existence ofan ... affirmative action plan [approved by mechanisms
created by the Michigan Civil Rights Act] does not insulate a state employer, or its plan, from all
judicial scrutiny.").

2009/10] AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALITIES

795

under due process, there is a "life liberty or property" interest) so as to alter
authoritative judicial precedents.162
Merriam-Webster says to "implement" is to "give practical effect to and ensure
actual fulfillment by concrete measures,"l63 which suggests a greater obligation than
the word "enforce." Black's Law Dictionary says to "enforce" is "to give force or
effect to"'6 while Merriam-Webster says to "enforce" is simply "to give force to."16 5
The constitutional mandate to "implement" and thus to insure actual fulfillment under
these definitions seemingly imposes greater responsibilities on the Michigan
legislature than are imposed on the Hawaii and federal legislatures who have only
enforcement authority. In drafting new state constitutional equality mandates, care is
needed regarding the language describing what role, if any, is played by legislators in
rights definition, redefinition, and enforcement.
V. CONCLUSION

Equalities in employment, housing, schooling, and other settings have broad
public support. Greater express state constitutional recognitions of self-executing
rights of all persons to be free from employment, housing, schooling, and other
discrimination on the basis of race, sex and other inappropriate classifications, subject
to limited legislative oversight, would extend equalities beyond federal law mandates.
They would reflect the establishment of fundamental local values and allow for
experimentation. They could also prompt varying balances between judicial and
legislative authority over equality, both between states and within states depending
upon the equality context.

162. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (viewing the enforcement
power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as "a positive grant of legislative power
authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment"); id. at 653-56 (suggesting that Congress
could have concluded itself that the English literacy requirement for voting at issue in the case
violated the Equal Protection Clause); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) ('The
ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive meaning
remains the province of the Judicial Branch."); id. at 81-83 (reasoning that a federal statute that is not
designed to remedy or prevent unconstitutional behavior may exceed Congress' enforcement power).
Even when Congress simply enforces, its statutes must exhibit "congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end." City of Boeme v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). Further, enforcement authority may only arise when there is more
than "anecdotal evidence" revealing "a widespread pattem" of Fourteenth Amendment violations.
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82.
163. MERRIAM-WEBsTER ENGLISH DIcnONARY, http://merriam-webster.com/netdict/
implementation (last visited Mar. 20, 2010).
164. BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 569(8th ed. 2004).
165.

MERRIAM-WEBsTER ENGLISH DICflONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary

/enforce (last visited Mar. 20,2010).

